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Self-interest vs. cooperation is a fundamental dilemma in animal behavior as well as in
human and organizational behavior. In organizations, how to get people to cooperate
despite or in conjunction with their self-interest is fundamental to the achievement
of a common goal. While both organizational designs and social interactions have
been found to further cooperation in organizations, some of the literature has received
contradictory support, just as very little research, if any, has examined their joint effects
in distributed organizations, where communication is usually achieved via different
communication media. This paper reviews the extant literature and offers a set of
hypotheses to integrate current theories and explanations. Further, it discusses how
future research should examine the joint effects of media, incentives, and social
interactions.
Keywords: distributed teams, information sharing, opportunism, cooperation, media richness, organizational
design, social interaction, interaction adaptation
INTRODUCTION
Self-interest, defined as “regard for one’s own interest or advantage, especially with disregard for
others1,” vs. cooperation, defined as “an act or instance of working or acting together for a common
purpose or benefit,” is a classic dilemma.
In organizations, how to get people to cooperate despite or in conjunction with their self-interest
is fundamental to the achievement of a common goal. The gains from cooperation are related to
the ability to achieve a goal beyond the reach of the individual. The long-term benefits may be entry
to the group or team. Yet, the returns may not be directly related to personal gains. The gains from
self-interested behavior are immediate returns to oneself, whereas the longer-term consequences
may be exclusion from the group or team.
Organization design theory contains a number of studies that examine how to best control
self-interest and obtain collaboration via different designs and incentives (Burton and Obel, 1980,
1988; Williamson, 1985). It is less clear whether such design and incentive solutions will have a
1http://dictionary.reference.com
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similar effect when interactions occur via media of different
“degrees of richness” (Daft and Lengel, 1986). This seems
important, however, as cooperation in today’s organizations
is often achieved via different media, some of which (e.g.,
TelePresence or Skype) are “richer” and thereby better able
to convey subtle meanings than others (e.g., e-mail or chat
messages).
While the media richness approach offers concrete advice
on which media to choose for effective cooperation (Daft
and Lengel, 1986), results regarding the effect of media on
cooperation remain contradictory. Further, whether the presence
or absence of media influences people toward self-interested
behavior remains an underexplored topic. One of the major
criticisms of the media richness theory has been that it is
too technologically deterministic (Markus, 1994; El-Shinnawy
and Markus, 1997). Instead, it has been argued (Barley, 1988;
Leonardi and Barley, 2008, 2010) that media can bring social
structures that can both enable and constrain behavior. Social
interactions (i.e., the processes where people act and react to
others) have been shown to lead to the development of trust
(Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1998; Jarvenpaa et al., 2004; Hill et al.,
2009), and cooperation, which, it is sometimes argued (e.g.,
Wilson et al., 2006), is a behavioral outcome of trust. However,
empirical studies have not shown a consistent, positive effect of
social interactions on people’s tendencies to behave cooperatively
(e.g., Hancock et al., 2010). Theories of interpersonal adaptation
hold interesting insights that may improve our understanding
of the role of social interactions in communications. Yet these
theories have not yet been integrated into the literature on
distributed teams, just as they have not been examined across
different media.
To shed light on the effect of media on cooperative vs. self-
interested behavior, both organizational design theory and social
interaction theory, as well as theories of interaction adaptation,
hold relevant insights. However, the insights from these theories
have not been related to each other in an integrated fashion.
Toward this purpose, the paper reviews extant literature related
to organizational design theory, media richness theory, social
interaction theory, and interaction adaptation, and suggests a set
of hypotheses based on current understanding. As the review will
show, current understanding derived from these theories holds
important, but not directly comparable insights, and some may
even seem contradictory. Nevertheless, all of the different theories
have empirical support. To integrate current understanding, and
reconcile previously assumingly contradictory findings, the paper
suggests a model that proposes an understanding of the joint
effects of design and social interaction theories on cooperative
vs. self-interested behavior in distributed teams (across different
communication media). The model is intended to serve as a
first step toward the development of testable hypotheses, and
subsequent empirical analyses.
The paper proceeds as follows: First, we review the
four theoretical perspectives: theories of organizational design;
theories of media richness; theories of social interaction, and
theories of interaction adaptation. Second, from our review,
we develop hypotheses about how organizational incentives;
media richness; social interactions, and interaction adaptation
influences employees’ tendencies to behave cooperatively or out
of self-interest. Finally, we develop our model to suggest an
integration of current literature, and propose a set of interactional
hypotheses, based on the model. The paper concludes with
a discussion of our findings for future theory and empirical
research.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Organizational Design Theory and
Cooperation vs. Self-interested Behavior
Parsons (1960:41), as quoted in Scott (2013), posited: “The
development of organizations is the principal mechanism by
which it is possible to get things done and to achieve goals
beyond the reach of the individual.” Through cooperation and
coordination, organizations allow individuals to achieve common
and individual goals that they cannot achieve individually.
Yet common goals may conflict with an individual’s self-
interests.
Within organization theory, self-interested opportunism is
ever present. Williamson (1985, p. 26) defined opportunism as
“self-interest seeking with guile,” which to Williamson (1985,
p. 47) includes lying, stealing, and cheating. More specifically,
with respect to information, the individual can manipulate
incomplete or distort the sharing of information, especially by
modifying information to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate,
or otherwise confuse partners in an exchange. Williamson’s
(1985) notion of opportunism therefore does not relate to
those situations where people, for example, withhold or distort
information without realizing the potential benefits of doing so;
rather, it relates to voluntary self-interested behavior, or cheating.
Not everybody behaves opportunistically; only some people
do, and they only do so sometimes. However, since some
people are prone to opportunism, it becomes important to
design safeguards to protect oneself, or the organization,
from opportunistic behavior. Traditionally, such safeguards are
achieved via hierarchical managerial control (e.g., hierarchical
governance; Williamson, 1985).
Following Williamson (1975), the advantage of hierarchy
is that employees are directly responsible, or controlled, by a
so-called third party. This third party, or manager, has what
Williamson refers to as “managerial fiat,” meaning that (s)he has
the right to resolve any conflict that emerges between employees.
An organizational hierarchy can solve many problems, as
employees who report to the same manager have less incentive to
seek advantage over each other. Further, if disagreements should
arise between employees, the third party has the authority to
solve them. Yet hierarchy itself is subject to opportunism, as the
manager is limited in his or her capacity to know all the relevant
information and make the required decisions. Further, middle-
level manages may have incentives that are not be aligned with
the corporate profits (Burton and Obel, 1988).
Williamson’s (1975) line of argument led to a number of
studies (e.g., Armour and Teece, 1978; Burton and Obel, 1980;
Williamson and Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1985) demonstrating
the efficiency of the M-form (multidivisional) over the
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U-form (unitary, or functional form) in handling strategic
and operational planning.
The U-form and M-form are two alternative forms for
organizing an organization. The U-form organizes by functions
(e.g., marketing and manufacturing), and each function has its
own middle manager. In the U-form the headquarters must
coordinate the activities of the functions (e.g., manufacturing and
marketing should align production and sales quantities). Here,
the headquarters may well have less than complete or accurate
information about the production or sales possibilities; in short,
it relies on the manufacturing and sales functions to supply
this information. Depending upon the incentive system or how
the manufacturing and sales managers are rewarded, it may be
advantageous for the manager to mislead the headquarters with
less than truthful information; that is, the manager is engaging in
opportunism.
In the M-form, manufacturing and sales are incorporated into
the same managerial unit for coordinating manufacturing and
sales. That is, the M-form organizes by products or markets
(e.g., shoes and bags, or Europe and America). In the M-form,
the headquarters has a different task of allocating resources; for
example, operating monies or capital investments among the
product or country units. Here, too, the M-form unit manager
might be opportunistic by misleading the headquarters on the
economic returns on the operations or investments. That is, the
headquarters has incomplete information on what is possible.
In short, opportunism is possible for both the U-form and
the M-form due to incomplete information and incentives that
encourage opportunism.
In a laboratory study, Burton and Obel (1988) investigated
whether managers would be opportunistic in the M-form and
U-form structures under corporate profit and divisional profit
incentives. First, they found that managers were quite aware that
opportunism was possible, i.e., they could influence their rewards
by distorting the information; second, the managers knew what
to do to take advantage of the situation, i.e., how to distort the
information to their own benefit; and thirdly, some managers
would behave opportunistically, some did not, and some were
altruistic. However, there were differences between the M-form
and U-form and between the corporate and divisional profits
incentives.
Investigating M-form and U-form organizations under
incentives based on corporate profit and divisional profits,
Burton and Obel (1988) found that corporate profit incentive
systems for cooperation led to less opportunism than the
divisional profit incentive system. This was as expected. Based on
that, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a: An incentive system based upon corporate profit
induces lower opportunism than an incentive system based upon
divisional profit.
Burton and Obel (1988) further found that there was greater
opportunism under the U-form organization. Not only was there
greater opportunism, the negative effect on corporate profits was
greater under the U-form. That is, opportunism for coordination
in the U-form is more damaging than opportunism for allocation
in the M-form. We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1b: When opportunism is present it will have a greater
negative effect on corporate profit in the U-form than in the M-form.
They further tested different incentives schemes and showed
how the organizational goal of subunit profit maximization
created subunit incentives, which were not compatible with the
overall corporate profit goals. Indeed, individuals sometimes
misrepresented information to their own benefit, and at the
potential expense of others (Burton and Obel, 1988). Hence,
alternative organizational incentives induced differing degrees of
information misrepresentations with varying impact on overall
organizational performance (Burton and Obel, 1988).
The studies reviewed above constitute state-of-the-
art thinking within organizational design theory on how
organizational design and incentives may lead to opportunism
but also may serve to reduce opportunism and increase
cooperation. Nevertheless, organizations’ contexts have changed
considerably since these theories were conceived. In today’s
organizations, many, if not all organizational interactions
take place using different media with colleagues who are not
co-located, e.g., multinational corporations. Some studies have
discussed the potential effects of virtuality on design solutions
(Jensen et al., 2009, 2010). Surprisingly little, however, is known
about whether design solutions and incentives also hold when
organizational members are distributed and have to coordinate
their actions via different media. Therefore it remains unclear as
to whether design incentives will have the anticipated effect on
cooperative vs. opportunistic behaviors in organizations in these
situations.
Media Richness Theory and Cooperative
vs. Self-interested Behavior
Media richness theory was originally introduced by Daft and
Lengel (1986), who proposed that communication media,
because they differ in their ability to provide cues, have different
capacities to reduce problems related to equivocality [i.e., what
Daft and Lengel (1986) referred to as problems that were
characterized by uncertainty but with the twist that they relate to
ambiguous situations]. Following Daft and Lengel (1986), face-
to-face is the richest medium because it provides immediate
feedback and multiple cues via body language and tone of voice,
and because it enables communicators to express themselves
in natural language. Again following Daft and Lengel (1986,
p. 560), rich media “facilitate equivocality reduction by enabling
managers to overcome different frames of reference and by
providing the capacity to process complex, subjective messages.”
Media of high richness, such as face-to-face meetings, were
therefore recommendable over written exchanges in solving what
Daft and Lengel (1986) referred to as equivocal situations. In
that sense, equivocal (or ambiguous) situations are different from
uncertain situations. In uncertain situations, you know what it
is that you need to know more about (e.g., you know whom
your customers are and what products they want, but you don’t
know how much they are likely to buy). With uncertainty, you
can collect information to reduce your uncertainty. In equivocal
situations, gathering more (factual) information may not help
you solve the task, because the actual problem you face is that
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you don’t know what the problem is [see Burton et al. (2015)
for a similar discussion]. Daft and Lengel’s (1986) theory was
proposed as a theory to describe and evaluate the appropriateness
of the usage of different media in solving different types of
organizational tasks.
Since the theory’s conception, the effects of different media
on cooperation have been widely studied by psychologists,
organizational theorists, and communication scholars, providing
numerous arguments in support of the idea that media of
high richness enable people to work together more effectively,
particularly on ambiguous tasks.
For instance, studies have shown that technological media
of low richness reduce both the verbal and non-verbal cues
that otherwise help the flow of conversation, facilitate turn-
taking, and help convey subtle meaning (Straus and McGrath,
1994). Similarly, a lack of visual channels has been found to
make coordination and cooperation more difficult in group
decision-making tasks (Baltes et al., 2002), just as the inability
to respond in real time (synchronously) has been found to lead
to communication difficulties (Dennis et al., 2008). Relatedly,
findings in the negotiation literature show that negotiators are
less contentious and more cooperative when they can see their
counterpart (Turnbull et al., 1976). A lack of cues has also been
shown to impede relationship development and subsequent trust
development (Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1998; Jarvenpaa et al., 2004;
Hill et al., 2009), lead to higher levels of conflict (Hinds and
Bailey, 2003; Hinds and Mortensen, 2005), reduced cooperation
(Naquin et al., 2008), and increased opportunistic defections (Bos
et al., 2002; Rockmann and Northcraft, 2008).
Clearly, communication technologies have changed
considerably since the original conception of the theory.
Video and online conferencing have communication attributes
that were not conceivable in the eighties. Whether new
communication media may replace, or at least be comparable to
face-to-face in their influence on cooperative vs. opportunistic
behavior, is not clear. Similarly, while the above studies have
examined the effects of media richness on cooperation, only a
few studies have examined whether media richness has a similar,
but opposite, effect on opportunistic behavior. Nevertheless, we
find it reasonable to argue that:
Hypothesis 2: Employees who interact via media of high richness
will behave less opportunistically than employees who interact via
media of low richness.2
Despite the evidence that media richness matters, there are
also a number of works that have failed to demonstrate a positive
effect of media richness on cooperation.
For instance, in a laboratory study, Watson et al. (1988)
failed to find support for their hypothesis that groups using
group-decision support systems, designed to simulate decision-
making when conflicting personal preferences were involved,
2Of course, these arguments are based on the likeliness of a given media to breed
opportunism, and not reflecting the way the availability of, for example, e-mail
or conferencing makes it possible to interact with people with whom one would
otherwise not interact at all. Nevertheless, even if the very availability of media
may decrease opportunism overall, our hypothesis relates to the relative likeliness
of opportunistic behavior across different media.
would exhibit more consensus, greater equality of participation,
and more confidence in their decisions.
Theories of Social Interaction and
Cooperative vs. Self-interested Behavior
A major criticism of the media richness theory has been
that it is too technologically deterministic. As argued by
DeSanctis and Poole (1994, p. 125): “advanced technologies bring
social structures which enable and constrain interaction to the
workplace.”
Consistent with this view, a number of field studies
have indicated that the process by which individuals in an
organization adopt (Fulk, 1993), interpret (Barley, 1988), and use
(Poole and DeSanctis, 1990; Orlikowski and Yates, 1994) new
technologies cannot be explained purely by the technological
properties of the different communication media. Pre-existing
social structures (Barley, 1986) as well as individual ways of
thinking (Barley, 1988) can play significant roles in the use
of communication media. Therefore, advanced information
technologies can bring social structures, which can both enable
and constrain information exchanges. While attempts have
been made to integrate the media richness theory with social
interaction theory (Swaab et al., 2012, social interaction theories
generally hold that the social structures have preponderance over
the effect of media). For example, Fulk (1993) found evidence
that group members’ use of electronic mail was influenced
by group members’ shared, identifiable patterns of meaning
concerning media. Similarly, Schmitz and Fulk (1991) also found
that social influences affected individuals’ use of new information
technology.
Also supportive of this line of thinking, Walther (1994) found
that the negative effects of computer mediated interactions over
face-to-face interactions diminished over time. Following
Walther (1992, 1994), people strive to develop positive
and meaningful relationships. Even if computer-mediated
technologies do not transmit social cues, which are important
to the development of positive and meaningful relationships, at
the same speed as face-to-face interactions, over time, users can
adapt to their limitations and effectively develop interpersonal
relations. Consistent with this model, decision makers who rely
predominantly on text-based communication channels can be
equally as successful as face-to-face teams if they take the time
to establish a positive interpersonal connection (McGinn and
Keros, 2002; Wilson et al., 2006).
Relatedly, Mortensen and Hinds (2001) found that
geographically distributed teams who shared a strong identity
experienced less conflict than distributed teams that did not
share a strong identity. Hinds and Mortensen (2005) examined
task and interpersonal conflict in both distributed and collocated
teams. They found that distributed teams reported more conflicts
than co-located teams, but also found evidence that shared
identify moderated the effect of distribution on task conflict.
On the other hand, Bicchieri et al. (2010) found that the type
of social interactions mattered for its positive outcome. In a
trust game laboratory experiment, they allowed half of their
participants to discuss any topic except those pertaining to the
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game. In the remaining sessions, participants were constrained
to only talk about topics identified by the researchers, and that
were not relevant to the game. Their results showed that the
type of communication (i.e., whether the type of communication
was restricted or unrestricted), and not the medium through
which participants communicated, had a significant impact
on first-mover investments (they made significantly higher
investments in the unrestricted conditions).
Even if it seems implicitly assumed in most of the above
studies that social interactions will reduce opportunistic behavior
and increase cooperative behavior, this has not been the explicit
focus of the above studies. However, the theories do suggest that
social interactions are essential for how people adopt media, and
that positive, social interactions may neutralize the (potentially
negative) effects of media. Based on this, we argue:
Hypothesis 3: Employees who experience a social interaction will
behave more cooperatively, regardless of the richness of the media
through which they interact.
Social interaction theories provide evidence for the
importance of developing social interactions. While most
hold that social interactions have a generally positive outcome,
we also found evidence (e.g., Bicchieri et al., 2010) that the type
of social interaction matters. From the literature (e.g., Mortensen
and Hinds, 2001; Hinds and Mortensen, 2005) it would seem
that trust and strong social identity are essential factors for
social interactions to result in a positive outcome. However,
the mechanisms that facilitate either trust or social identities
or other identifiers of positive social interactions, and not the
least, whether these mechanisms are similar for collocated and
distributed teams, are not clearly defined.
Interaction Adaptation and Cooperative
vs. Self-interested Behavior
One field of study that holds potentially interesting insights into
the mechanisms underlying the positive development of social
interaction, but which has not yet been integrated into the study
of distributed organizations, is interaction adaptation theory
(Burgoon et al., 2007). Interaction adaptation theory focuses
on how individuals coordinate their communication behaviors
temporally with those of another conversant to achieve a kind of
“goodness of fit” between them” (Burgoon et al., 2007, p. 19). As
described by Condon and Ogston (1971), this “goodness of fit,” or
synchrony, relates to the cyclical nature of behaviors rather than
similarities between the behaviors themselves.
One central perspective to the study of interpersonal
adaptation is the joint action literature, relating to the study of
social interaction whereby interactors coordinate their actions in
space and time (Sebanz et al., 2006, p. 70). Numerous joint action
studies have demonstrated how people not only have a natural
tendency to imitate, mirror, or mimic each other’s physical
expressions, but also that people whose motor behaviors are
synchronized tend to feel higher affiliation, liking, and generally
experience the interaction as smoother (Bernieri, 1988; Hove and
Risen, 2009; Lakens and Stel, 2011). Such synchronization, even
if people are not consciously aware of it, has been shown to
have positive effects on people’s efficiency in joint action tasks
(Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009). Synchronization therefore has
been argued to capture an innate human ability to adapt to
others, an ability which humans have inherited evolutionarily
for enhanced efficiency in social interactions (Hove and Risen,
2009). We adapt to others to better understand and to make our
behaviors suit those of others for better accomplishment of joint
goals.
Studies have shown how individuals through social interaction
synchronize not only their motor behaviors, but also their
heart rates (Konvalinka et al., 2011; Mitkidis et al., 2015); and
their skin conductance responses (Mønster et al., 2015). It
has been suggested that synchrony should be perceived as a
psychophysiological measure of shared emotions (Konvalinka
et al., 2011; Håkonsson et al., 2015; Mønster et al., 2015).
Consistent with this, Mønster et al. (2015) found that high
synchronization also was predictive of high perceived coherence
in teams, just as Mitkidis et al. (2015) found that high degrees of
heart-rate synchrony in an unrelated joint task was predictive of
high mutual trust, expressed in terms of a public goods game.
As another measure of trust, research has shown that when
one is trusted, one’s brain produces oxytocin in proportion
to the degree of trust shown (Zak et al., 2005; Morhenn
et al., 2008). Zak and Knack (2001) argue that trust affects an
organization’s ability to accomplish its objectives because trust
acts as an economic lubricant, easing the social interactions
necessary to meet goals. Following Zak et al. (2005), the brain
chemical oxytocin increases awareness of others’ emotional
states. This awareness in turn makes people more effective at
cooperating. Further, the amount of oxytocin is a rapid brain
signal, turning on when we are shown trust, and shutting down
during periods of high stress or extreme competition (Zak,
2012).
The above studies point to the innate human ability to adapt
to others, an ability that may even explain the efficiency of
social interactions. It is an ability that has evolved evolutionarily,
long before different information technologies appeared. This
ability seems to provide a potentially relevant understanding
of the conditions that promote cooperation as well as the
conditions that lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Based on
the above, it would seem that interaction adaptation is essential
for employees to develop a cooperative mindset. Therefore we
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4: Employees who experience interactional adaptation
will behave less opportunistically than employees who do not
experience interactional adaptation, regardless of the media
through which they interact.
Despite its promising insights, the effects of coherence
have not yet been fully explored, and no work has tested
whether interactional adaptation may occur across different
media. Even if new media such as Skype and TelePresence have
altered traditional understandings of technologically mediated
communications (see Daft and Lengel, 1986), such media still do
not provide the same visual, sensory, and olfactory cues that face-
to-face interaction does, and therefore may not enable employees
to synchronize in the same way.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 May 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 692
fpsyg-07-00692 May 10, 2016 Time: 11:39 # 6
Håkonsson et al. Cooperative Behavior in Distributed Teams
TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL
Each of the four theoretical approaches—organization design
theory, media richness theory, social interaction, and interaction
adaptation theory—provides relevant insights toward an
understanding of the conditions that further opportunistic
behavior vs. cooperative behavior in distributed decision-
making. The four hypotheses developed above are contained in
Table 1. Their relationships are illustrated in Figure 1.
As also appears from Table 1 and from Figure 1, the different
perspectives have not yet been integrated into a comprehensive
understanding of cooperative vs. self-interested behavior in
distributed teams. Even if all of the theories reviewed contain
important insights, none of the four approaches fully accounts
for all potentially influential aspects. This does not mean that
the theories are not valid; indeed, they have all been empirically
demonstrated to be relevant.
The organizational design literature seems clear—
organizational form and incentives matter, and it is possible to
reduce opportunistic behavior through organizational form and
incentives. Yet, the studies have not been extended to virtual
contexts, so it is not clear whether organizational form and
incentives matter to the same extent when people interact via
different communication media.
Evidence from the media richness literature indicates that
media richness influences whether people behave cooperatively.
Even if the media richness theory has not dealt specifically
with opportunistic behavior, there is empirical evidence that
high media richness promotes cooperation. The media richness
theory, however, has been criticized for placing too much
emphasis on the type of media used.
Despite the empirical evidence of the media richness
approach, the social interaction literature has provided empirical
evidence that the richness of the media is less influential.
Rather, the social context and social connections are essential to
understand people’s use of media. Yet, there are studies (Hancock
et al., 2010) that have shown that the type of social interaction is
essential for its positive outcomes. This raises the issue of what
a “social connection” is—how does it emerge, and what are the
conditions for its development?
The interaction adaptation literature shows that people have
an innate human ability to adapt to each other, and that
when they do, they produce specific hormones or develop
physiological synchrony. Whether or not such interactional
adaptation occurs might be predictive of the positive effects of
the social interactions. But the interaction adaptation literature
has, to our knowledge, only examined people in face-to-face
interactions. This raises the issue as to whether an ability
that human beings developed evolutionarily also applies when
people interact via communication media of different degrees of
richness.
Overall, it seems that the theories are complementary rather
than contradictory. While it is not possible to determine from
current literature how the theories interact, Figure 2 illustrates
an overview of possible interactional relationships between the
main constructs, derived by the theories reviewed.
TABLE 1 | Main hypotheses.
Supporting literature Non-supporting literature
Main hypotheses
Hypothesis 1a: An incentive system based
upon corporate profit induces lower
opportunism than an incentive system based
upon divisional profit.
Armour and Teece, 1978; Williamson and
Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1985; Burton and
Obel, 1988
Hypothesis 1b: When opportunism is present it
will have a greater negative effect on corporate
profit in the U-form than in the M-form.
Armour and Teece, 1978; Williamson and
Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1985; Burton and
Obel, 1988
Hypothesis 2: Employees who interact via
media of high richness will behave less
opportunistically than employees who interact
via media of low richness.
Turnbull et al., 1976; Daft and Lengel, 1986;
Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1998; Baltes et al.,
2002; Bos et al., 2002; Hinds and Bailey, 2003;
Jarvenpaa et al., 2004; Hinds and Mortensen,
2005; Dennis et al., 2008; Naquin et al., 2008;
Rockmann and Northcraft, 2008; Hill et al.,
2009
Lewis and Fry, 1977; Carnevale et al., 1981;
Watson et al., 1988; Swaab and Swaab, 2009
Hypothesis 3: Employees who experience a
social interaction will behave more
cooperatively, regardless of the richness of the
media through which they interact.
Barley, 1986, 1988; Watson et al., 1988;
Schmitz and Fulk, 1991; Walther, 1992, 1994;
Fulk, 1993; DeSanctis and Poole, 1994;
Markus, 1994; Orlikowski and Yates, 1994;
McGinn and Keros, 2002; Hinds and
Mortensen, 2005; Wilson et al., 2006
Bicchieri et al., 2010
Hypothesis 4: Employees who experience
interactional adaptation will behave less
opportunistically than employees who do not
experience interactional adaptation, regardless
of the media through which they interact.
Zak and Knack, 2001; Zak et al., 2005;
Morhenn et al., 2008; Hove and Risen, 2009;
Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009; Konvalinka et al.,
2011; Zak, 2012; Håkonsson et al., 2015;
Mitkidis et al., 2015; Mønster et al., 2015
Wiltermuth, 2012
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FIGURE 1 | Main hypotheses from current literature.
FIGURE 2 | Main and interactional hypotheses.
Figure 2 acknowledges the literature’s established
relationships: that media exerts an influence on employees’
cooperative behavior; that organizational form and incentives
reduces opportunism (assumed to increase cooperative
behavior); that social interaction often increases cooperation, and
that interaction adaptation has been demonstrated to influence
cooperation. These relationships are all illustrated by dotted
lines in Figure 2. Thereby, Figure 2 contains all the relationships
contained in Figure 1.
In addition to these established relationships, Figure 2 also
points to additional possible interactions between the constructs
that can be derived from the literature, some of which may even
explain some of the non-supporting literature findings. These
possible interactions are marked by full lines in Figure 2 and are
discussed in the below.
Interactional Relationships Related to
Media Richness, Organizational Form
and Incentives, and Cooperation
In the lower part of Figure 2, we suggest that the organizational
form and incentives to cooperate (Burton and Obel, 1988)
will be influenced by the effects of different degrees of media
richness. In other words, we expect that organizational form
and incentives will moderate the effects of communication
media on cooperation (see Figure 2). Previous literature has
argued that a “cooperative mindset” will moderate the effects of
media on cooperation (see Swaab et al., 2012). Here, we argue
that organizationally induced incentives to cooperate will have
the same effect as “cooperative mindsets.” There is evidence
in the literature (De Dreu et al., 2000) that decision makers
with a high concern for their own and others’ welfare share
more information about underlying interests and priorities than
those with egoistic orientations (see also Swaab et al., 2012).
Similarly, De Dreu and Carnevale (2003), based on a literature
review, concluded that people with a cooperative mindset are
more likely to share information. De Dreu and Carnevale
(2003) also concluded that decision makers with a cooperative
mindset were more prone to interpret others’ actions as efforts
to coordinate. This, in turn was found to increase the quality
of their interaction outcomes (De Dreu and Carnevale, 2003).
Therefore, the literature does not indicate that employees with
an incentive to cooperate will be more or less dependent
on the presence or absence of visual channels. This can be
formulated as:
Hypothesis 5: Employees with an incentive to cooperate will be
equally cooperative when interacting via media of high richness or
via media of low richness.
On the other hand, there is also literature (e.g., Swaab et al.,
2012) indicating that media richness may reinforce incentives not
to cooperate. Employees with an incentive not to cooperate are
likely to also expect others not to cooperate. When employees
with an incentive not to cooperate interact via media of high
richness, this may lead them to interpret others’ signals as
signs of non-cooperation. Consistent with this, decision makers
with non-cooperative orientations have been found more likely
to apply competitive tactics when they can see each other
compared to when they cannot see each other, and have been
found to receive lower joint gain as a consequence of this
behavior. For instance, Lewis and Fry (1977), in a laboratory
experiment, asked pairs of 46 participants to take the role of
buyer and seller to agree on prices for three commodities. They
found that a barrier which eliminated visual contact facilitated
subjects’ discovery of mutually advantageous alternatives for
participants instructed with an individualistic orientation, and
had no effect on subjects instructed to consider their opponent’s
position (a problem-solving orientation). Similarly, Carnevale
et al. (1981), in an experiment involving a similar task to that
of Lewis and Fry (1977; i.e., where pairs of 132 participants
had to take the role of buyers and sellers and agree on prices),
examined the effects of accountability and visual access in
integrative bargaining, and found that visual access served as a
moderator of the effects of accountability. That is, accountability
produced lower joint benefits when negotiators were face-to-face.
Cooperative behavior and reports of cooperative atmosphere
were also lower when negotiators were face-to-face rather than
talking across a barrier. Swaab and Swaab (2009) found that
male (but not female) negotiators perceived the presence of eye
contact in negotiations as more competitive and threatening
and, as a result, shared more information in the absence of eye
contact. These results suggest that media of high richness may
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serve to intensify non-cooperative strategies. In other words,
and as depicted in Figure 2, this would predict that media
richness moderates the relationship between incentives and
cooperation.
While the opposite has also been found to be the case—that
highly motivated liars interacting in a text-based, computer-
mediated environment were more successful in deceiving their
partners compared to motivated liars interacting face-to-face
(Hancock et al., 2010)—there seems to be convincing evidence
supporting the argument that media richness reinforces non-
cooperative incentives. Media of high richness convey feelings,
not just factual information; therefore their presence may escalate
the existence of non-cooperative incentives, in turn leading
to less information sharing, and in turn creating a mutually
reinforcing strategy of opportunistic behavior. This suggests
that:
Hypothesis 6: Decision makers with an incentive to behave
opportunistically will behave more opportunistically when
interacting via media of high richness than via media of low
richness.
Interactional Relationships Related to
Media, Synchrony, Social Connection,
and Cooperation
As appears from the upper half of Figure 2, another possible
relationship is that media richness will influence whether or
not employees develop interactional adaptation. Since interaction
adaptation is an ability that people have developed evolutionarily,
before the emergence of different communication media, it
would be interesting to examine whether such adaptation, or
synchrony, can emerge when people are not face-to-face, and
therefore do not receive the same visual, olfactory, and other
stimuli. For instance, it may be that people can only synchronize
when they are face-to-face—or when they interact via advanced
media such as TelePresence, or perhaps Skype. With these
media, employees communicate synchronously. Even if they do
not receive olfactory stimuli, they still have eye contact. Such
examinations might even lead to an extension of the media
richness theory (Daft and Lengel, 1986).
Synchrony is a measure of social connection, or shared
emotions (Konvalinka et al., 2011; Mønster et al., 2015), and
of trust (Mitkidis et al., 2015). If synchrony only occurs when
people interact via media of high richness, this may also provide
evidence to previous findings related to the importance of prior
acquaintance (Oshri et al., 2008; Hinds and Cramton, 2013).
As these studies have demonstrated, having once met in person
reduces subsequent problems related to communication via
media. Synchrony might be one mechanism that drives this—
employees who once have developed synchrony may experience
a cohesive bonding that makes it easier to trust each other later
on. Hence, one possible hypothesis is that:
Hypothesis 7: Employees who interact via media of high richness
will have an easier time developing synchrony than employees who
interact via media of low richness.
It may also be possible to relate interactor adaptation to the
lack of consistence in studies related to social interactions and
cooperation, as interactor adaptation might be an explanatory
factor for whether or not social interactions lead to cooperative
behaviors, regardless of the media. While there is not existing
literature that examines these matters, one might expect that
if there is interactor adaptation, employees will cooperate. If
there is not, they will not cooperate. This would suggest a
mediating effect on the relationship between media richness and
cooperation:
Hypothesis 8: The effect of social interactions on cooperation is
mediated by the degree of synchrony between employees.
The above interactional hypotheses are included in Table 2,
together with the main hypothesis derived in the first part of
the paper. In Table 2, Hypotheses 6–8 constitute the possible
interactional relationships that we illustrated in Figure 2, and that
were discussed in the above.
It does seem that Hypotheses 6–8 are able to explain some
of the literature’s previously contradictory findings. Hypothesis 5
predicts that incentives and organizational form will overrule the
effects of media richness such that media, under such conditions,
will not have its predicted effects. Similarly, Hypotheses 7 and
8 predict that social interactions might overrule the effects
of media on cooperative behavior. Moreover, Hypothesis 8
proposes that the reason why social interactions may not
always lead to cooperative behavior can be explained by
whether or not the social interactions are such that they lead
to interaction adaptation. While there is support for these
arguments in the literature, this is of course subject to be
demonstrated, and, it would seem, a subject worthy of future
studies.
CONCLUSION
We examined four major streams of literature with relevance
for explaining self-interest vs. cooperation in distributed
organizations, i.e., in organizations where communication is
achieved via media of different degrees of richness.
From the review, it is apparent that all the lines of evidence
contain relevant insights. At the same time, some of the literature
also held contradictory findings. Finally, no literature, to our
knowledge, had examined the joint effects of the four different
perspectives.
Organizational design studies hold that incentives may further
cooperative behavior, but their applicability has not been
systematically examined across different communication media.
Media richness theory has been criticized for being deterministic,
and for not incorporating evidence that a positive connection,
or a shared group identity, can overcome the difficulties that
employees sometimes face in the absence of communication
channels. Accordingly, social interaction theories contradict
the richness approach by showing that the absence of visual,
vocal, and synchronous communication channels does not
necessarily deteriorate social interactions. Social interaction
theories, however, are not very specific in terms of identifying
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TABLE 2 | Main and interaction hypotheses.
Supporting literature Non-supporting literature
Main hypotheses
Hypothesis 1a: An incentive system based
upon corporate profit induces lower
opportunism than an incentive system based
upon divisional profit.
Armour and Teece, 1978; Williamson and
Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1985; Burton and
Obel, 1988
Hypothesis 1b: When opportunism is present it
will have a greater negative effect on corporate
profit in the U-form than in the M-form.
Armour and Teece, 1978; Williamson and
Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1985; Burton and
Obel, 1988
Hypothesis 2: Employees who interact via
media of high richness will behave less
opportunistically than employees who interact
via media of low richness.
Turnbull et al., 1976; Daft and Lengel, 1986;
Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1998; Baltes et al.,
2002; Bos et al., 2002; Hinds and Bailey, 2003;
Jarvenpaa et al., 2004; Hinds and Mortensen,
2005; Dennis et al., 2008; Naquin et al., 2008;
Rockmann and Northcraft, 2008; Hill et al.,
2009
Lewis and Fry, 1977; Carnevale et al., 1981;
Watson et al., 1988; Swaab and Swaab, 2009
Hypothesis 3: Employees who experience a
social interaction will behave more
cooperatively, regardless of the richness of the
media through which they interact.
Barley, 1986, 1988; Watson et al., 1988;
Schmitz and Fulk, 1991; Walther, 1992, 1994;
Fulk, 1993; DeSanctis and Poole, 1994;
Markus, 1994; Orlikowski and Yates, 1994;
McGinn and Keros, 2002; Hinds and
Mortensen, 2005; Wilson et al., 2006
Bicchieri et al., 2010
Hypothesis 4: Employees who experience
interactional adaptation will behave less
opportunistically than employees who do not
experience interactional adaptation, regardless
of the media through which they interact.
Zak and Knack, 2001; Zak et al., 2005;
Morhenn et al., 2008; Hove and Risen, 2009;
Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009; Konvalinka et al.,
2011; Zak, 2012; Håkonsson et al., 2015;
Mitkidis et al., 2015; Mønster et al., 2015
Wiltermuth, 2012
Possible interaction hypotheses
Hypothesis 5: Employees with an incentive to
cooperate will be equally cooperative when
interacting via media of high richness or via
media of low richness.
Burton and Obel, 1988; De Dreu et al., 2000;
De Dreu and Carnevale, 2003; Swaab et al.,
2012
Hypothesis 6: Decision makers with an
incentive to behave opportunistically will behave
more opportunistically when interacting via
media of high richness than via media of low
richness.
Lewis and Fry, 1977; Carnevale et al., 1981;
Swaab and Swaab, 2009; Swaab et al., 2012
Hancock et al., 2010
Hypothesis 7: Employees who interact via
media of high richness will have an easier time
developing synchrony than employees who
interact via media of low richness.
Daft and Lengel, 1986; Oshri et al., 2008;
Konvalinka et al., 2011; Zak, 2012; Hinds and
Cramton, 2013; Mitkidis et al., 2015; Mønster
et al., 2015
Hypothesis 8: The effect of media on
cooperation is mediated by the degree of
synchrony between employees.
whether social interactions always have positive outcomes. Here,
interaction adaptation theories would seem to hold potentially
relevant insights, as they maintain that it is the interactors’
adaptation, measurable by trust, synchronization, or hormonal
levels that matters, not necessarily the social interaction in
itself.
Overall, therefore, our review of the current literature led
us to conclude that none of the theories is sufficient in
itself, and that the theories should be reconciled for a more
complete understanding of cooperation vs. opportunism and
their antecedents.
Toward this purpose, our paper suggested a set of possible
interaction hypotheses that all had support from the literature,
and that also might explain some of the previous findings’
contradictory results. Whether these hypotheses hold evidence is
naturally the subject of future empirical studies.
Given that self-interest vs. cooperation is a fundamental
dilemma in organizational behavior, and given the fact that more
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and more firms communicate via different media, some of which
hold technological properties that are substantially different from
when the media richness theory was conceived in the 1980’s, does
seem a worthy subject of future studies.
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